Music, medicine and embodiment. by Evans,  H.M.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
17 July 2012
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Evans, H.M. (2010) ’Music, medicine and embodiment.’, The Lancet., 375 (9718). pp. 886-887.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(10)60376-5
Publisher’s copyright statement:
NOTICE: this is the authors version of a work that was accepted for publication in The Lancet. Changes resulting
from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control
mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted
for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in The Lancet, 375, 9718, 2010,
10.1016/S0140-6736(10)60376-5
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Music, medicine and embodiment 
H M Evans 
Centre for Medical Humanities 
Durham University 
 
[Appeared in Lancet 375, March 13 2010; 886-7] 
 
 
I strongly suspect that the consolations of music are more apparent, and to 
overwhelmingly more people, than are those of any other form of art. This is 
reflected in the fact that in daily life one is vastly more aware of people voluntarily 
and habitually accessing music than any other art form. Then why is music so 
overwhelmingly popular? The explanation is, I suspect, less a matter of 
neuroscience, evolutionary theory or palaeo-anthropology than of a partly-
philosophical account of human nature. The relevance of this to health and illness 
might not immediately be apparent but, as I shall argue, both the fact of music’s 
enormous hold on us, and the kind of explanation we might give for it, are actually 
important for clinical medicine. Why this should be so is the subject of this article. 
A particular focus is the question of why music can have a therapeutic effect. This 
is distinct from the question of how it works therapeutically, because ‘how’ 
questions tend to invite answers that identify mechanisms, usually physical ones. By 
contrast, ‘why’ questions invite answers that involve meaning and significance in 
people’s experience (including the reasons for choosing or deciding to do 
something). There may be astounding physical mechanisms implicated in music’s 
therapeutic effects (including those employed in formal musical therapy) but, since 
listening to music is first and foremost an experience, then music’s therapeutic 
potential must principally involve other things characteristic of experience – 
attitudes, expectations, affects, the imagination, memory, bodily self-awareness – 
that cannot be reduced to physical mechanisms alone. 
Let me forestall one distracting source of objection at this point. In talking of 
music’s therapeutic effect or potential I am not specifically referring to technical 
practices employed by professional music-therapists (though nor am I excluding 
these). I am concerned simply with the power of music to make people feel better, 
whether this be formalised within a technical clinical procedure or, alternatively, 
pursued individually as a source of fulfilment, consolation or refreshment – such as is 
compellingly described by physician and cellist Danielle Ofri in a previous 
contribution to this series. So let me use the expression ‘music-as-therapy’ to cover 
all instances of specifically therapeutic musical benefit, be they accidental or 
intended, informal or tightly professional. 
Why then does such benefit arise? If we enjoy music at all then there is obviously 
what one might colloquially term a ‘feel-good factor’ involved but this, too, requires 
explanation. Why does music make us feel good, and why might that feeling-good 
have therapeutic value? Folk wisdom has it that ‘a little of what you fancy does you 
good,’ and feeling good doubtless in itself does you good. But medical science seems 
unwilling to let things rest there (hence the enormous interest in musical experience 
within neuroscience) so if we can be more specific about why music as therapy 
works then we might expect to secure its benefits more reliably and deliver them 
more effectively to the most responsive audience. 
One route to music-as-therapy’s appeal – which is presumably a part of its 
effectiveness – might lie in understanding music’s overwhelming popularity. Of 
course, some art form or other had to be the most popular, so perhaps it merely 
happens to be music. But this is puzzling when we set music’s popularity alongside 
the recognition that, in and of itself, music doesn’t portray or depict or represent 
anything. Instrumental music (sometimes tendentiously called ‘absolute music’ or 
‘pure music’) in particular is standardly an abstract art-form, not a representational 
one – unlike virtually all other art forms which standardly are representational. 
Generally people strongly prefer visual and dramatic and literary art in their 
representational forms, and they dislike (or are at best mystified by) abstract 
painting, sculpture, dance, or surreal or expressionist literature or theatre. Yet (song 
lyrics and libretti apart) this general aversion to the abstract in art is frequently set 
aside in the case of the single overwhelmingly most popular art form, where the 
abstract is central. 
In art, one plausible way of specifying ‘the abstract’ is as a recognisable concern 
with forms rather than with representational content – a concern with the way 
things are put together rather than what they might be taken to depict. Instrumental 
music is characteristically like this: it is a kind of structured playfulness in sound, an 
experiment in combining its own materials. And what are those materials? 
In school-book isolation, they are principally its tones, intervals, rhythms, melodic 
sequences, harmonic progressions, structures. But these dry notions come alive in 
sound – music has only a vestigial, ghostly existence on paper – and they come alive 
moreover in our recognitions and expectations of sound. This means that, in a wider 
context, music’s own materials also include the forms taken by our experiences of 
listening and singing and playing. Music thus consists also in those expectations, in 
our sense of familiarity, of surprise, anticipation, tension, release, freedom, 
constraint and so on. As we will see, these are very much among the forms of 
embodied experience, and they suffuse the abstractions in which music deals. 
Now there is an obvious objection which, if sustained, would have consequences 
not only for this account of music but also for the sort of ‘explanation’ one might 
give for why music can be therapeutic. The objection is that music is indeed ‘about’ 
something independent of itself, namely human emotions, both in general and also 
actual, specific, literal emotions supposedly endured by the composer and/or 
engendered in the performer and the listener. This objection arises from a quite 
general fixation with emotion as the ‘object’ represented in or expressed by music, a 
fixation that is as widespread as it is mistaken. If the ‘emotion’ account of music 
were correct, it would brand music as a representational art after all, and it would 
invite a merely cathartic explanation for the workings of music-as-therapy. But a 
widespread mistake is still a mistake, in this case perhaps part of a generally 
enduring hangover from the Romantic period in art. I think the reason for its grip 
upon us is that we are misled in two respects. First I suspect an uncritical attachment 
to representation elsewhere in art makes us subconsciously yearn for it also in 
music, so that we (equally uncritically) attach to certain conventional forms and 
phrases a set vocabulary of usually dull and hackneyed specific emotions (happy, 
sad, tragic, triumphant, etc.), invariably attributing them literally to composers and 
listeners alike despite all evidence and reason to the contrary. But second, there is 
an important sense in which we are indeed moved by music, but much more literally, 
much less figuratively, than we suppose. The urges to tap along, or to dance, or to 
alternate muscular tension and relaxation, or to meter our breath, for instance, are 
certainly case of music’s moving us. We have registered music’s calling to a very 
physical sense of our own being, proprioception, willed movement and agency – in 
short, a sense of our own physical and sensory embodiment – but we seem 
collectively to have mistaken this for something much less interesting and far less 
plausible, a narrow and clichéd litany of emotion-terms. 
Let us put all this in the context of what we might call the natural facts of life 
about music, sophisticated and complex social activity though it be. Music exhibits 
certain facts about our own embodiment – our size, the characteristic length of our 
limbs and vocal chords, the volume of our lungs and the chambers of our hearts – 
that make particular resonances natural and comfortable for us both tonally and 
rhythmically. And music also reflects natural facts in the universe around us, 
including the subdivision of tonal frequencies that produce harmonies of vibration 
for us as for all material objects. Tonal systems do vary around the world but less 
than the cultural relativist or the post-modernist might suppose: something close to 
the basic tonality of western music from Byrd to the Byrds may be recognised in at 
least three continents. 
What I draw from this is that music expresses aspects of the forms of our 
embodied experience, forms that exhibit our natural physical state in its musculo-
sensory reality. By this I mean those general forms of experience realised in rhythm, 
proprioception and kinaesthesia; in muscular agency with its characteristic dynamic 
tensions; in anticipation and resolution; in willed changes to amplitude of 
movement; in a sense of oneself located both in closely-cushioned immediacy and in 
vertiginous space; and no less in that sense of memory and identity that works 
alchemically upon sequence and repetition in music. Music stands in strongly natural 
relations to these fundamental facts about our shared embodied experience, though 
of course it is modulated, through socially-understood varietal forms, by the agency 
of individual imaginations (on the part of composer, performer and listener alike). In 
short, music expresses general forms of our experience, rather than specific 
emotional contents which must more plausibly be left to the literary and other 
representational arts. Musical experience is pre-organised in our nature, but 
transformed by socially-moderated imagination – as is all our experience, of course. 
And this takes us back, at length(!), to music-as-therapy which, as we noted at the 
outset, is first and foremost an experiential matter. 
When music works upon us therapeutically, it expresses, recalls and even 
rekindles general features of our embodied experience and of our ordinary being. I 
am not suggesting that it causes a return to healthier or pre-morbid states in any 
mechanical sense, but rather that in recalling ordinary being it reinforces that being, 
and reinforces us – it inclines us in the direction of bodily and psychological fluency 
and vitality. The benefit may stop when the music stops, or it may persist – Oliver 
Sacks describes both outcomes – but in either case it arises, surely, out of a more 
strongly resonant fit between the organic fabric of agency and the imagination, 
brought about by music’s deep engagement with the sorts of creatures we are. 
A final thought concerns another kind of philosophical ‘deep engagement’ – 
though one that we must here allow to remain at the level of conjecture. 
Schopenhauer thought that the sorts of creatures we are – material beings but with 
consciousness and a direct knowledge of ourselves – gave us a glimpse of reality 
beyond the world of perception. Intriguingly, he thought that music also gave us 
fundamental insights into the nature of reality, and so Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
unites music with the human body in a radical way. Although such intimidating 
conjectures are not necessary for us to begin to understand music’s therapeutic 
capabilities, they do hint that music might be an expression not merely of our 
ordinary being but of our place in the universal order of things. Were this so, it 
would invite a far more radical conception of why music can always console us and, 
sometimes, can heal us. 
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